







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
PROBLEM OF INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL REFORM.

BY

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Prohibition as a Problem of Individual and Social Reform.

BY PROFESSOR JAMES GIBSON HUME.

HAT it is a large part of the philosopher's work to deal with the commonplace, and to make us more explicitly aware of what we already vaguely know must be my excuse for discussing the threadbare topic of Prohibition, in answer to the request of the editor to write "something on some sociological problem from a philosophical standpoint."

Reform is one of the most familiar conceptions of modern thought, which dates from the Renaissance and the Reformation. Let us, however, pause a moment to note the meaning of "reform" and the nature of the being capable of reform.

The most zealous advocate of "reform" must admit that a large part of the universe is not open to this process. The Highest Being in the universe cannot be reformed, for He is already perfect. The lower spheres of the universe, the mechanical external cosmos cannot be reformed. Changes may be made in inorganic nature, mechanical or chemical; plant life may be modified in various ways; animals may be trained and improved; but only that most cunning animal, man, possesses the capabilities for reform; man alone requires fundamental reformation. Without dwelling on those features of man's nature that make reform desirable, let us first consider what renders it possible. To state it briefly, we may say it is man's conscious possession of a peculiar capability of initiative, or free or voluntary action. Unlike the forces and beings around him, propelled by the conditions of the past inevitably, man may look forward and onward and upward to the future and better. He may look back upon his own past and

learn its lessons ; he may apply those lessons in the present ; he may look forward and strive successfully to realize what is ideal. Man not only "rules nature by obeying her laws," he rules also the one who rules nature—himself—and he may demand from himself that he should enter upon a new line of action that has in view and requires the complete transformation of his present self-hood ; he may "lose his life to save it." Now this free act and moral decision, this conscious struggling transformation of the character, is the field of "individual reform."

That this struggle towards perfection of character and conduct requires for success a reverent love for and devotion to the supreme ideal ; that this supreme ideal is Perfect Personality, and that this spiritual process is one in which the struggling moral agent may receive in some way assistance and strength and renewing, is the central thought of Christianity, which not only asserts that the human soul must receive grace, but also insists that only by an act of obedient effort can this assistance become effective, and that this is a process going on whereby the sinner who has turned about continues "to work out" (not to) "his own salvation with fear and trembling."

It is a moral-religious experience—moral in so far as it turns from the past, religious in so far as it turns towards the future ; and in so far as this is just the same right-about-face, it is always and necessarily moral and religious together.

Diametrically opposed to this view of the vital and inseparable union of morality and religion is the prevailing tendency to regard morality and religion as entirely distinct and completely separated.

Theory always affects practice, and the theory of separated morality and religion leads in practice to two futile lines of endeavor. The first futile effort is an attempt to live a moral life without religion ; the second is the attempt to live a religious life without morality.

The moral effort that excludes and utterly repudiates religion produces a great deal of squirming and twisting and wriggling, but, like a mud-turtle on its back, though there is much movement, much beating of the air, there is no genuine progress. Before true progress can take place, the whole self-centred attitude of morality without religion, with all the variations and refinements of this attitude, needs to be reversed. A Copernican revolution must take place from the man-centred to the God-centred universe.

Seeing that a morality that excludes religion falls short, there is a very natural tendency to jump to the conclusion that moral effort should be utterly abandoned for the religious life. The religious life

as opposed to the struggle and effort and activity of morality, is conceived as one of rest and peace and receptivity. Undoubtedly the religious life has in it rest and peace and receptivity, but if we exclude the moral element of struggle and action entirely, this rest and peace and receptivity becomes a purely mechanical passivity. But the soul cannot receive mechanically and passively, unless the soul is a mere mechanism. If the soul is spiritual, even its receptivity must be spiritual. Nevertheless, many people speak and think of the soul as if it were a kind of substance or matter to be stamped upon, like John Locke's famous "wax tablet" mind. And this view of the soul, combined with the attempt to exclude moral effort, leads them to suppose that, both in the inception and in the continuance of the religious life, the "wax tablet" "phonographic cylinder" attitude is the correct one. Only a very earnest conviction of its fundamental inadequacy could lead me to call in question a view of religion so widely believed, so systematically taught. In the interests of religion there is needed a protest against this peculiar method of eviscerating faith of its meaning. Faith, which is so carefully opposed to "works," is in reality itself a work, both on man's part and on God's part—a co-operation of work. A passive faith is a round square. The life of active faith (a tautology) is a life of faithful work (not "works").

The inadequate effort of the morality that excluded religion failed, not because it was too moral, but because it was not moral enough. When it became truly moral, it abandoned the ingathering selfishness at the root of its movement for an outgiving unselfishness that recognized and adopted the highest duty—the duty of being true to Truth—and apprehended that this highest truth was the true life of perfect goodness and perfect love and perfect self-sacrifice in the Perfect Godman—the Way, the Truth, the Life.

We must eat and drink the flesh and blood of this life, make it our own life, our flesh and blood. At the very moment that the moral effort became truly moral, it became truly religious.

For the inception of the religious life a moral effort of faith on man's part is demanded to faithfully accept and adopt as his own what is freely offered. If this truth were clearly grasped and explicitly taught, many who are sitting waiting to "get religion" as children catch the measles, would see that the responsibility rested entirely on themselves for their failure. Morality is needed for the inception of the religious life; morality is needed at each stage in the religious life.

But the inveterate determination to absolutely separate, to have *either* morality *or* religion will make some reader exclaim: "Away with

such rubbish ; it is an attempt to put morality in place of religion." By no means, my indignant friend ; it is an attempt to prevent the mutilation of religion ; an attempt to allow religion to be rounded, adequate, complete. What right have you to take the moral element out of the religious life ? Granting that the religious life must receive, it still remains true that there must be a right attitude before the soul can receive. It is admitted that this right attitude is faith, but my claim is that faith is not idleness or indifference or ignorance or mechanical passivity, but activity and earnestness and fidelity. "He that hath ears to hear, *let him hear*," said Christ. "To him that hath (an ear that hears) shall be given."

Prohibition is, in part, a matter of "individual reform." It is evident that any attempt to explain "individual reform" takes us at once into the storm-centre of all the controversies that have ever waged about the nature of man, the world, and God, and their proper relation. As in theory, so in practice, the attempt to attain to "individual reform" on one's own part, or to lead others to "individual reform," is to face the most momentous and critical and far-reaching turning-point in life.

This is the great problem the church strives to solve in theory and in practice. The state, on the other hand, is specially concerned with what we may term "social reform," the problem of the regulation of society and social conduct through legislation or governmental action of some kind. In "social reform" one of the initial difficulties is to attempt to answer the question, "In what relation does society stand to the individual ?" What is the justification for legislation ? What may be accomplished by means of legislation ?

Because society, in the last resort, rests upon and is made up of individuals, and as all collective decisions and actions must react upon individuals, it is very natural to conclude that in reality we have only individuals acting or being acted upon, and the term "society" is merely a confused name for referring to a number of individuals.

This all seems so natural and self-evident that we learn with a shock of surprise that it is in reality a very recent and modern view of society and of the individual.

Early civilization never recognized the individual as an individual. The individual was merged in family or tribe or clan or caste. Paradoxical as it may be to us, society preceded the individual. At least it preceded the individualistic individual, the one consciously aware

of his own individuality, the one explicitly demanding for himself certain rights and opposing them to the claims of society.

Christianity did a great deal to awaken and deepen the consciousness of individuality. With Christ we have the question, "What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" The infinite worth of the individual is here plainly indicated.

During the middle ages the individual was largely dominated in an extraneous, external or arbitrary way by church and state. It was the downtrodden individual who arose, like a giant from his sleep, in the Reformation period, broke the secular power of imperial Rome, and disintegrated the great centralized church.

It is indeed true that new secular and religious organizations at once took the place of those which had been resisted or rejected. We shall find that the individual again and again, with growing consciousness of power, resists various social claims, repudiates the "Divine Right of Kings," and more and more claims the "Divine Right of the People" — "*Vox populi, Vox Dei.*" Triumphant democracy thus threatens to sweep away every social barrier. The individual is supreme. "*L'État c'est moi.*"

But just here a great difficulty presents itself. Granting the individual to be supreme, what is said individual going to do about it? Will he dispense with social control altogether? If he continues to tolerate it or use it, to what extent, on what grounds, according to what principles? This is the great problem for the individualist to solve.

What is the place and function and justification for collective or social action?

Let us note a few problems that all turn upon the enquiry concerning social or collective action. What, to begin with, is the place of government in our national life? How should government be constituted? How conducted? How regulated? In English history we read of the stages of the struggle through which we have passed in our endeavors to obtain the boon of "representative government." Yet we are far from satisfied. Some, like Professor Dicey, claim that representative government needs to be amended by a division of labor, whereby every department of it will be carried on by a committee of experts; and this sounds reasonable. On the other hand, many claim that legislation affecting the whole people should be more directly decided upon by the whole people by a vote, or "Referendum." This also sounds reasonable; but these two reasonable proposals are in apparently opposite directions, and both propose to amend what has

long been regarded as the highest form of government. Then there are proposals and agitations for further extension of the franchise ; demands for what has been termed "the emancipation of women" ; the claim that women, too, should be directly and by vote consulted in regard to legislation that affects everyone in the community. This is a far-reaching question. There are difficulties about the proper functions of a government. Should government merely restrain or control individuals and corporations, or should it become an active participator in corporate action ? Should government undertake and carry on certain enterprises usually conducted by individuals or corporations ? In the debate—sometimes acrimonious—that goes on between the individualists and the collectivists, there is usually a failure to see that already in the great corporations we have abandoned strictly individualistic action without having arrived at fully collective action. The result is that the large corporation is sometimes dreaded, sometimes lauded by both individualists and collectivists.

If the corporation is condemned, each will repudiate it. The individualist will call it a collectivist affair ; the collectivist will say it acts irresponsibly and is not truly collectivistic, but rather individualistic. On the other hand, if the corporation is regarded as successful, each will claim it. The individualist will say : "Look at the results we gain by our method." "Excuse me," the collectivist will say, "it's success is due to our method." In spite of the radical divergence of views on such a fundamental point in theory, in practice the government has actually undertaken many enterprises, and conducts them as national, social and collective affairs. Education, for instance, in all its aspects, positive and negative, preventative or reformatory ; the postal service ; in some cases canals, railways, telegraph and telephone systems, electric lighting, and other so-called "natural monopolies," are being nationalized or municipalized—conducted by the country as a whole, or by county or city.

Then we come to a sphere of government where the antagonism between individualism and collectivism does not seem to be so extreme ; where government seems to be a compromise between the extremes in its exercise of supervisory or merely regulative control of various professions, as law, medicine and teaching ; where it regulates trade and commerce by tariffs and copyrights and patents ; where it controls usages bearing on health and general well-being in its laws regarding quarantine, vaccination, sanitation, etc., and probably under the general demand for sanitation and hygiene we should include what is the special problem we are considering—the regulation or prohibition of

the traffic in and use of tobacco, opium, various poisons, and alcoholic liquors.

It is, in the very nature of the case, inevitable, therefore, that prohibitory legislation should be the meeting-point and battle-ground of opposing views.

An attempt has been made to indicate, to some extent at least, the fundamental opposition in the attitude towards government in general that underlies the view of the controversialists, so that we may see that this opposition and conflict is not restricted to a particular class of legislation, as is sometimes falsely supposed, but is found wherever legislation is proposed or enacted.

Much of the opposition to prohibitory legislation, based on the disinclination to have the profits of a lucrative business decreased or destroyed, is as easy to understand as it is difficult to overcome. In addition to this, however, a certain amount of opposition to prohibitory legislation arises from a view of the nature of government and legislation which leads to a suspicion, distrust or dislike of any extension of collective control.

That the direct antagonism of principles underlying the opposing theories regarding collective action is frequently overlooked, is due to the fact that the attention is chiefly drawn to the other antagonism already mentioned, and also to the fact that in reality "prohibition" is a complex problem, and in the discussion of some of its phases the antagonisms referred to need not enter. Let us indicate some of these phases, and then single out the one in which we shall find the most direct conflict in opinion, the most radical divergence of view.

First, we have the purely scientific question about the nature of the action of the drug, tobacco, opium, or alcoholic liquors on the human organism in health and in disease. Here doctors may differ; still it is a field which lends itself to some extent to experiment, and scientific examination from which we may expect more and more unanimity with increasing scientific knowledge. Then, in addition to the physical effects of the drug, from the standpoint of health or impairment of bodily function, we have the question concerning what we may term the psycho-physical effects of the drug in health and in disease. In what way does it affect the nervous system and show itself in the feelings, emotions, passions of the one who uses the drug? Here, too, it is a matter for scientific observation, although even the ordinary man who has cultivated powers of exact observation should be able to arrive at a fairly accurate and reliable conclusion, if he has had sufficient opportunity to observe, and has been careful to observe accurately.

Then we come to a question that falls more within the province of Political Economy, the question of profit and loss to the individual, and to the community, from the use of the drug in question.

As a subordinate enquiry along the same line would follow an enquiry into the profit or loss in a purely financial way of various schemes for regulating the traffic, such as excise duties, high and low licenses, restriction of number of places selling, restriction of hours of sale, the Gothenburg system, etc. An enlightened economist would, of course, avoid the glaring errors of many amateur debaters on this topic. He would not, from a national standpoint, confound collecting with producing agencies. He would not conclude that a direct tax is necessarily a national misfortune, if it should turn out that it imposed less burden than some indirect tax which it removed, if the incidence of the tax was more in proportion to ability to pay, and he would not overlook indirect gains and losses from the various plans used to regulate or prohibit the traffic.

Next we may come to the prudent individual who desires to act wisely. From the standpoint of expediency he may consider the advantages or disadvantages to himself of using the drug. What effect has it on his efficiency in his work or profession? What influence in making his position precarious or stable? In case of loss of a position, how does the habit act in its influence on the views of employers? How does it affect the social standing of himself and his family? What bearing has it on the class of friends he and his family will form? What bearing on the future of his family?

The individual may rise to a higher level, and raise more distinctly moral and religious issues. What is the effect of the habit on his disposition and conduct? Does it tend to weaken or strengthen the habit of self-control? Does it in any way tend towards sensuality, or sloth, or self-indulgence, or selfishness? Does it tend to remove temptations or open the way to them? Does it help or hinder the power to resist temptations? Does it lead to more careful consideration for, or to a tendency to ignore the comfort or well-being or rights of others? Does it ever lead to a condition of temporary irresponsibility, for which, however, we are responsible, because voluntarily assumed?

In what way does it harmonize with or antagonize my highest aims, plans, purposes and ideals?

And so the questions may continue upward through the moral into the religious field.

Lastly, we come to the discussion of the place of legislation upon

this usage and traffic. At once we find springing up the two opposing forces.

Different opinions may be held and expressed about the scientific facts observed regarding the effect of alcoholic liquors on body and disposition. Varying estimates may be made of the question of profit and loss, and in the question of moral or religious significance there may be lack of complete agreement. But in all this the differences of opinion are not brought into such direct antagonism as to constitute a conflict of opinions.

Different individuals may have different views and opinions, and conclusions, and agree to differ. But when we come to state action and legislation, we are attempting to decide upon ONE mode of action, which, if adopted, must affect each one in the community, and in whose consequences each one must share, and at once it becomes evident that difference of opinion must become conflict of opinions, and a struggle for supremacy. Now, let the fittest survive. No one need try to shirk this conflict. In the nature of the case it cannot be avoided if we are to remain a community and have government and legislation of any kind.

But perhaps we have gone ahead too rapidly. The opponents of Prohibition may say: "We take the ground that legislation in any form whatever is illegitimate. Legislation is a form of governmental control. This becomes a restriction of the rights of the individual, and is an encroachment by government upon ground beyond its jurisdiction." This argument is seldom put in such a general and sweeping form. Government and legislation in general is not called in question, but merely this particular proposed kind of social control. In the argument against legislation the objector stands upon individual rights against the encroachments of society. Hence he is inclined to select the phase of the legislation whereby it affects the man's own *use* of the drug or liquor. He carefully avoids discussing the *traffic* in the drug because the individualistic argument against encroachment loses its plausibility when applied to manufacture and sale, for these are not so easily claimed as "individual rights," not to be interfered with. On the other hand, advocates of restriction are likely to place the whole emphasis on the traffic, manufacture and sale as a social interchange, as a kind of business, and like all other forms of business, open to social regulation in the interests of the community.

It is curious to note that these two standpoints are reflected in punishments of law-breaking in this connection. The one who sells liquor after hours breaks a certain law. The one who buys from

him breaks the same law, or at least aids, abets and bribes the first to break it. But in many cases the law is framed and the punishments are enforced only against the first, and not at all against the second.

Even in the limited field from which the opponent of restriction wishes to exclude legislative control, when confronted with an extreme case of what he will term the abuse of privilege or right, where the individual makes himself a nuisance or a menace to his neighbors, he will concede that some supervision or restraint is required or allowable. He is slower in admitting the right or propriety of interference if the individual restricts his obnoxious conduct to the circle of his own family.

Yet even in conservative England, where a man's house is his castle against the world, law has stepped in to say that certain articles of furniture may not be sold or pawned by the husband for liquor, such as children's clothing, or the sewing machine or washtub by means of which the wife provides for the family.

Very few of the opponents of restriction, in their opposition to encroachments of government upon individual rights, are extreme enough or logical enough to absolutely deny a place for governmental control; they instinctively feel that this would really issue in complete anarchy. One of the points on which the opponent of restriction feels himself strong and secure in his protest against interference, is in asserting that government should not interfere in a man's liberty of thought and opinion. This seems so strong a claim that it is usually conceded, but having gained this concession, the opponent of restriction frequently slips in the claim that a certain kind of conduct or practice is with him a matter belonging to his own sphere of opinion, or liberty of thought, and then asks for exemption from restriction as a matter of right.

Now it is easy enough to see that this claim is illegitimate. A government may deem it right or wise or expedient or necessary, to refrain from attempting to control or regulate a man's opinions or convictions. It is worth noting that even from the standpoint of extreme collectivism, liberty of opinion in individuals must have a wide extension in order that there may be a means of determining what form of collective action expresses most adequately the wishes of the community.

But the moment the individual proceeds to act in accordance with his opinions the whole discussion takes on a new significance. Actions go forth into the social arena, and so cannot be overlooked by society.

Let a man hold whatever opinions he pleases so long as he **HOLDS** them, but if he once lets them go, expresses them even in words or writing, the matter is different. Another individual may appeal to government to protect him from the slander or libel contained in the *expressed* opinion.

Unfortunately for clearness of thought, the debate has been carried on by both parties largely from the standpoint of determining when a man's action becomes a nuisance to his fellows. Underlying the controversy is a conceded element or point of agreement that has not been seriously considered, and it is just these hidden assumptions that need to be brought to light.

There is assumed by both parties to the controversy, that there is a realm of action entirely belonging to the individual himself, upon which sphere government may be warned off as a trespasser. It is analogous to the theory of State rights in the Constitution of the United States.

According to this theory, the central government can deal only with such matters as have been explicitly conceded to it by the State in question, and all matters not so conceded are held to belong entirely to the State itself. The laws regulating divorce, for example, are regulated by each State, and thus we have the scandal of a legal marriage or divorce in one State being illegal in another. Now this "State-right theory" of the individual, in his relation to the community, is perhaps the prevailing one, and some courage is required to boldly challenge its correctness. It assumes an individual with a separate and independent realm of action entirely his own. Even where government action is permitted, it is regarded as a concession made by the individual in his magnanimity to the government. Wherever government attempts to extend its jurisdiction over this inner field, it is encroaching, it is an aggressor.

I think it will be found much easier to talk vaguely about the field of private rights than to locate and accurately define that field. May we not wax bold enough to question the whole assumption and ask, is there any kind of action conceivable that keeps itself shut up in an inner circle of individual control and in no way directly or indirectly affecting others?

The individual would be the one who possessed and controlled this sphere. The individual would thus be capable of an entirely separated and independent existence. But, pray, what kind of an individual would he be, so circumscribed and limited?

If we cease talking about some abstract conception of an individual,

is not the actual concrete individual as we know him, on every side, intimately and vitally related to society?

Was not St. Paul nearer the truth when he likened the members of a social organization to the members of one body?

The individual as a child is entirely dependent upon the social surrounding. The family, the primary unit of society, is not atomic.

The family is not a separated unit, for as the child in the family so the family in the State is bound to the wider life and dependent upon it. In industrial life with growing civilization the ramifications of interdependence are simply innumerable.

When we come to our beliefs and opinions, which are rightly regarded as the most private of possessions, can it be claimed that they are separated absolutely from society? Is not a large part of our mental possessions a heritage bequeathed to us from the labors and struggles of a vast army of thinkers and writers? Is not their contribution a result of social co-operation?

But even where we ourselves add to the stock of acquired knowledge by our own thought, is this something that belongs to an individual absolutely separated from other individuals? Not so, for if we are to arrive at any valuable result by our thinking, we must think in accordance with certain great logical and mathematical principles that are no man's private possession, but rather social or universal.

Even in our moral acts, most fundamentally our own, the significance, morally and religiously, would be impaired or lost if the individual could indeed "live unto himself." What about the virtues of honesty, truth-telling, benevolence, to the atomic being?

Even a Robinson Crusoe on a desert island proceeds to treat himself as an organized being, and not as an atomic being. He considers the future as well as the present, and so reaches beyond the circumscribed limits of a separated existence.

The whole assumption of a separately existing, absolutely independent and self-sufficient individual, is incapable of being justified. Our discussion, therefore, should abandon this myth. What we should talk about is not concerning imaginary boundary lines, but about the wisdom or ultimate significance or tendency of any proposed legislation.

Does this obliterate the individual? On the contrary, it allows the individual to free himself from artificial limitations and enter upon a wider realm.

It does not follow that because there is no absolutely separated sphere of individual action, that everything should be decided by a collective

vote. The members of society may see the wisdom of allowing the individual to act according to his own judgment, which, if sound, is not peculiar to himself, on very many and important matters.

We have instanced marriage laws in referring to State rights. Although marriage is something so vital to society that it cannot relinquish control, it may wisely leave much, or nearly all, to individual choice.

The caprice of the individual is checked here by the need of harmonizing with the caprice of another individual, and this constitutes good social discipline.

The rights of minorities, so vaguely referred to by many, will not be swept away, for the right of a minority is the right, by argument and persuasion, to become a majority. Is liberty abolished? What is liberty? Read our English history again and find the record of our struggles for *liberty*. Was it for a so-called right of doing as each one pleased? On the contrary it restricted such kind of action in the monarch. Government by the people, for the people, was what was sought and largely attained. A man's opinions are more important when regarded socially and made effective in social control. It widens the significance of private opinion. But laws may be enacted that limit me? True, and if the limitation is injurious or unwise, let us endeavor to prove this, and modify the law. A good law restricts no one who wishes to obey it.

But suppose the question of prohibition is now discussed from the new standpoint, what objections may be raised?

It may be said of legislation, which, like prohibition, seems aimed at a result of moral character, "You cannot make men moral by legislation," and some will go further, and add, "you may cause others to deteriorate morally. For men grow morally by resisting temptation, and if your legislation removes this temptation, you prevent moral development."

I believe these objections are, IN PART, true, but claiming to cover the whole ground, while in reality only partial, they become the most specious kind of untruth - the half-truth. They are half true, but claiming to be wholly true and the whole truth, they become utterly misleading and fundamentally false.

Every scientist is aware that it requires a combination of conditions to bring about a given effect. If any one of these conditions is omitted, the others fail in bringing about the result. But the scientist does not turn around and say that therefore the elements already contributed are useless; he merely says that by themselves they are incom-

plete, and proceeds to supplement the inadequacy by the needed condition.

Let us illustrate. By the half-truth way of arguing, we may say a gun is useless in war. How prove it? Because a gun is intended to shoot the enemy and no gun will shoot. Need the fallacy be further indicated? It is perfectly true that the gun alone will thus fail. Even with the addition of bullet and powder, it will fail. We need the gunner to adjust the conditions, and then the gun is no longer useless. So with the objection to legislation. *Alone*, it fails to accomplish the moral result. It does not follow that it contributes nothing. St. Paul, who was no mean logician, knew this fallacy perfectly. He likens law to a schoolmaster leading us to Christ. It is a splendid analogy. Law teaches. Like the teacher, it requires the co-operation of the pupil. Sir Henry Maine likens law to the block that, placed behind the wheel, prevents the waggon slipping down hill while the horses are resting. The horses would be the enlightened civilization that saw the need of law. But if law also teaches, it is pulling upward as well as preventing backsliding. Law helps, not only in reforming, but in forming men.

The other half-truth about removing temptation is, perhaps, more insidious, and yet even a tyro can detect its inadequacy. Certainly we grow as individuals and as a community by resisting and overcoming temptation; but the essence of the growth is in the uncompromising hostility to the temptation. How, then, can we successfully bring forward a temptation in a friendly way with one hand, our social regulation, to knock it down with another—our private action. Punch-bag temptations do not develop moral muscle. Whether we act in our private or in our public capacity, we must, if we are to be truly moral, in both resist and overcome evil and remove temptation. Let no one fear that he will be left with nothing to do!

These objections against legislation show that the relation of morality to legislation has not been carefully considered. This is just the question of the relation of individual reform to social reform, and it lies at the foundation of the relation of Church to State. The objections presuppose that social reform is proposed as a substitute for individual reform; but this is not the case. Social reform is not a substitute for, but a supplement to, individual reform. The two efforts are complementary. The individual reform is inadequate that does not issue in new and better collective action.

Social reform is inadequate if it does not contribute toward individual reform. The first tries to mould the whole by changing the indi-

viduals, but as it entirely rests on consent it fails to reach all, and so falls short in collective or social reform. It goes deep, but it does not extend widely enough.

On the other hand, social reform can bring in all the members more or less successfully, because it deals with external action and compulsory regulation. And it also desires to effect individual reformation by its modification of the environment. But though such individual reformation is sought, the pressure of the social requirement is incomplete in its effect, and the desired result never fully realized in the case of any individual until that individual willingly co-operates.

The social reform is wide enough, but, in many instances, not deep enough.

It is evident that these two efforts really harmonize. The harmony of the two tendencies is most obvious in a national system of education; and because all advancement in civilization is focussed in such co-operation, a national system of education is on the one hand a very fair index of the progress of any nation, and on the other hand to make efficient in the highest degree a national system of education is the most powerful and effective means the enlightened patriot can employ to make his country truly great.

Even when we do our utmost in both directions, by "moral suasion" and by "legislation," much will remain unsatisfactory because of the unwillingness or resistance of the individual to the well-meant efforts of others. There is no royal road to complete reformation; but because we cannot do everything, it does not follow that we cannot do anything.

What we can do is demanded of us who are obedient to the claims of duty. We cannot excuse ourselves on the ground that others will continue to be unfaithful and unbelieving and fundamentally oppose and reject every effort put forth on their behalf. No *faithful* effort is altogether lost, whether it be in the attempt to further the social demand or in the conscientious endeavor to transform it into new tendencies.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "J. M. Hume". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a long, horizontal flourish extending to the right.